We consider in this chapter a class of two-player nonzero-sum stochastic games with incomplete information, which is inspired by recent applications of game theory in network security. We develop fully distributed reinforcement learning algorithms, which require for each player a minimal amount of information regarding the other a player is in an active mode, she updates her strategy and estimates of unknown quantities using a specific pure or hybrid learning pattern. The players' intelligence and rationality are captured by the weighted linear combination of different learning patterns. We use stochastic approximation techniques to show that, under appropriate conditions, the pure or hybrid learning schemes with random updates can be studied using their deterministic ordinary differential equation (ODE) counterparts.
a player is in an active mode, she updates her strategy and estimates of unknown quantities using a specific pure or hybrid learning pattern. The players' intelligence and rationality are captured by the weighted linear combination of different learning patterns. We use stochastic approximation techniques to show that, under appropriate conditions, the pure or hybrid learning schemes with random updates can be studied using their deterministic ordinary differential equation (ODE) counterparts.
Convergence to state-independent equilibria is analyzed for special classes of games, namely, games with two actions, and potential games. Results are applied to network security games between an intruder and an administrator, where the noncooperative behaviors are well characterized by the features of distributed hybrid learning.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, game-theoretic methods have been applied to study resource allocation problems in communication networks [2] , security mechanisms for network security and privacy [1, 17] , and economic pricing in power networks [9] . Most frameworks have assumed the rationality of the agents or the decision-makers as well as the complete information about their payoffs and strategies. However, in practice, due to the noise and the uncertainties in the environment, agents often have information limitations in their knowledge not only of other players' payoffs and strategies, but also of their own. For this reason, we must consider the learning aspects of the decision-makers and address their estimation and assessment of the payoff and strategy based on the information accessible to them.
In this chapter, we consider a class of two-player nonzero-sum stochastic games with incomplete information. We develop fully distributed payoff and strategy reinforcement learning (CODIPAS-RL) algorithms, which require for each player a minimal amount of information regarding the other player. At each time, each player can be in an active mode or in a sleep mode. If a player is in an active mode, she updates her strategy and estimates of unknown quantities using a specific pure or hybrid learning pattern. In contrast to the standard reinforcement learning algorithms which focus only on either strategy or payoff reinforcement for the equilibrium learning, INTRODUCTION the algorithm that couples the payoff reinforcement learning together with strategyreinforcement learning allows an immediate prediction and updates the strategies by updated estimations based on recent experiences. The payoff reinforcement learning in our proposed algorithms bears a connection with the Q-learning algorithms in [23, 26] , which have been commonly applied to learn the Q-functions of Markov decision processes (MDPs).
We specifically discuss five pure CODIPAS-RL algorithms and use stochastic approximation techniques to show that, under appropriate conditions, the pure or hybrid learning schemes with random updates can be studied using their deterministic ordinary differential equation (ODE) counterparts. Convergence to state-independent equilibria is analyzed under specific payoff functions such as those in games with two actions, and Lyapunov games.
We apply the learning algorithms to a class of security games where an attacker and an intrusion detection system (IDS) strategically choose their actions to optimize their payoffs. Many forms of security games have been formulated to provide quantitative security and dependability analysis of networked systems [1, 17, 32] . However, technical difficulties in quantifying appropriate security metrics or payoff functions render it difficult to specify the utility functions for the attacker and the defender. In addition, the inevitable false positive and false negative errors in the detection often lead to incomplete information in a dynamic network environment. Our hybrid learning framework for the two-person game with incomplete information provides an appropriate theoretical basis for the on-line implementation of game-theoretic algorithms.
Related Work
Learning in games has been investigated in several papers in the recent literature. In [10, 22] , a fictitious-play algorithm is used to find Nash equilibrium in a nonzerosum game. Players observe opponents' actions and update their strategies in reaction to others' actions in a best-response fashion. The authors in [18] propose a modi- to know their own payoff so as to find their optimal actions. In this chapter, we are interested in fully distributed learning procedures, where players do not need any information about the actions or payoffs of the other players, and, moreover, they do not need to have complete information of their own payoff structure.
Young proposes in [29] such a completely uncoupled learning rule, called interactive trial and error learning. Players occasionally try out new actions and accept them if they lead to higher payoffs. If a player experiences a decrease in payoff due to strategy changes by some other players, he initiates a random search for a new strategy and settles on one with a probability that increases monotonically with its realized payoff. When used by all players, the learning scheme yields pure-strategy Nash equilibrium behavior under an interdependency condition. However, in games without pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, it fails to yield Nash equilibrium strategies.
In [25, 28] , strategy reinforcement learning in finite games has been studied.
The ordinary differential equation (ODE) approximation of the learning algorithm is
shown to be equivalent to an adjusted replicator dynamics [24] . In [15] , a multipletime scale model-free algorithm is introduced and it is shown to be asymptotically equivalent to the smooth fictitious play algorithm. In [31, 32] , we introduce a class of combined distributed payoff and strategy reinforcement learning schemes (CODIPAS-RL), and propose a heterogeneous learning algorithm for two-person zero-sum stochastic games with incomplete information, where different players can adopt different learning schemes and learning rates. In [30] , we propose a Q-learning algorithm for zero-sum stochastic games and apply it to dynamic configuration problems of intrusion detection systems.
Contribution
In this chapter, we consider a class of general-sum two-person games and introduce (F2) We allow the interaction between the players to occur at random times unknown to the players.
We use stochastic approximation techniques to show that the hybrid learning schemes with random updates can be studied using their deterministic ODE counterparts. The ODE obtained for hybrid learning is a linear combination of ODEs from pure learning schemes. We show the convergence properties of the learning algorithms for special classes of games, namely, games with two actions, and potential games, and demonstrate their applications in a network security environment.
Organization of the Chapter
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 14.2, we formulate the two-player nonzero-sum stochastic game with incomplete information and introduce the solution concept of state-independent Nash equilibrium. In Section 14.3, we present a number of distinct learning schemes and discuss their properties. In Section 14.4, we present main results on learning for general-sum games. In Section 14.5, we apply the learning algorithms to a network security application. Section 14.6 concludes the chapter. In Table 14 .1, we summarize the notation used in the chapter for reader's convenience.
TWO-PERSON GAME
In this section, we consider a finite two-person nonzero-sum game (NZSG) in which each player has stochastic payoffs and the interactions between the players are ran- 
Weakened fictitious-play strategy νi,t ∈ R+ Payoff learning rates of Pi at t λi,t ∈ R+ Strategy learning rates of Pi at t
The unit vector with 1 at the position of ai and 0 otherwise external states of Pi, which describes the environment where Pi resides. We assume that the state space S := i∈N S i and the probability transition on the states are both unknown to the players. A state s i is randomly and independently chosen at each time from the set S i . We assume that the action spaces are the same in each state.
In addition, players do not interact at all times. A player can be in one of the two modes: active mode or sleep mode, denoted by mode B i = 1 and B i = 0, respectively. Let B i , i ∈ N , be an i.i.d. random variable on Ω i := {0, 1} whose probability mass function is given by
The player modes can be viewed as internal states that are governed by the inherent randomness of the player. The system mode B 2 ∈ Ω := Ω 1 × Ω 2 is a set of independent modes of the players and we denote by B 2 ⊆ N as the set of active players corresponding to B 2 .
The NZSG is characterized by utility functions 
In particular, we define e ai ∈ R |Ai| , with a i ∈ A i , as unit vectors of sizes |A i | , whose entry that corresponds to a i is 1 while others are zeros. We assume that the mixed strategies of the players are independent of the current state s and the player mode B i . For any given pair of mixed strategies, (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 , and for a fixed
∈ Ω, we define the expected utility (as expected payoff to Pi) as
where E x1,x2 U i denotes expectation of U i over the action sets of the players under the given mixed strategies. A further expectation of this quantity over the states s and B 2 , denoted E s,B 2 , yields the performance index of the expected game. We now define the equilibrium concept of interest for this game, that is the equilibrium of the expected game.
Since the expected game is a two-player game with finite actions for each player, we can show the existence of the equilibrium using Nash's existence theorem [20] and state the following lemma.
Lemma 14.1 (Existence)
The stochastic NSZG Ξ with unknown states and changing modes admits a state-independent equilibrium.
LEARNING IN NZSGS
In this section, we introduce different learning schemes for the stochastic NZSGs introduced in Section 14.2 and discuss the stochastic approximation of the learning schemes with ODEs.
Learning Procedures
In many practical applications, the players in the two-person NZSGs do not have the complete knowledge of their payoff functions and the state of their environment. Moreover, they do not know whether they interact with the other player or not. Hence, the equilibrium strategy has to be learned online by observing the pay- vectors θ ij,t ∈ R 2 , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, as follows.
where θ ij,t is Pi's count of Pj's number of activities since t ≥ 0 and the initial condition is given by θ ij = 0, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}. The active players choose an action a i,t ∈ A i at time t and observe or measure an output u j,t ∈ R as an outcome of their actions. Players estimate their payoffs by updating the entry of the estimated payoff vectorû i,t+1 ∈ R |Ai| that corresponds to the chosen action a i,t . In a similar way, players update their strategy vectors x i,t+1 based on a specific learning scheme (to be introduced later). The update of the strategy vectors can exploit the payoff informationû i,t from the previous time step. In this case, we say the learning is coupled; otherwise, we say that it is uncoupled.
The general coupled learning updates on the strategy and utility vectors take the
where Π i,t , Σ i,t , i ∈ N , are properly chosen functions for strategy and utility updates, respectively. The parameters λ i,t , ν i,t are learning rates indicating players' capabilities of information retrieval and update. The vectors x i,t ∈ X i are mixed strategies of the players at time t.û i,t , i ∈ N , are estimated average payoffs updated at each iteration t, and u i,t , i ∈ N , are the observed payoffs received by players at time t. The learning rates λ i,t , ν i,t ∈ R + need to satisfy the conditions
The learning rate of Pi is relative to its frequency of activity. In general, the learning rates are functions of θ ii , i ∈ N , and can be written as λ i,θii(t) , ν i,θii(t) . We need to adopt a time reference for the game using maximum learning rates among the active players, i.e., λ * t := max i∈B 2 (t) λ i,θii(t) , ν * t := max i∈B 2 (t) ν i,θii(t) . It can be verified that the reference learning rates λ * t , ν * t satisfy (C1) and (C2) if λ i,t , ν i,t D R A F T October 2, 2011, 1:59am D R A F T satisfy the conditions for every i ∈ N . The learning rates λ * t , ν * t , as we will see later, affect the ODE approximation.
We call the learning in (14.2) a COmbined DIstributed PAyoff and Strategy Reinforcement Learning (CODIPAS-RL) [31] . The players can have different learning rates for their utility and strategy updates. The payoff learning rate is on a faster time scale than strategy learning rate if λ i,t /ν i,t → 0 as t → ∞; it is on a slower time scale if ν i,t /λ i,t → 0 as t → ∞. In the former case, the payoff learning can be seen as quasi-static compared to the strategy learning and vice versa for the latter.
Learning Schemes
We introduce different learning schemes in the form of (14.2) for the stochastic NZSG. Let L = {L k , k = 1, 2, · · · , 5} be a set of five pure learning schemes.
A player Pi chooses a learning schemes P i from the set L. We call the learning homogeneous if both players use the same pure learning schemes and heterogeneous if players use different learning schemes, i.e., P 1 = P 2 .
14.3.2.1 Bush-Mosteller-based CODIPAS-RL L 1 Let Γ i ∈ R be a reference level of Pi and
The learning pattern L 1 is given by
The updates on the strategy and the estimated payoff are decoupled. The strategy update does not exploit the knowledge of estimated payoff but only relies on the observed payoffs at each time slot. The strategy update of L 1 is widely studied in machine learning and has been initially proposed by Bush and Mosteller in [8] . Combined with the payoff update, we obtain a COPIDAS-RL based on Bush-Mosteller learning. When Γ i = 0, we obtain the learning schemes in [3, 6] .
be the Boltzmann-Gibbs (B-G) strategy mapping given bỹ
It is also known as the soft-max function. When ǫ → 0, the B-G strategy yields a (pure) strategy that picks the maximum entry of the payoff vectorû i,t . The learning pattern L 2 is given by
The strategy and the estimated payoff are updated in a coupled fashion. The numerical value of experiment is used in the estimation, and the estimated payoffs are used to built the strategy (here the estimations are crucial since a player does not know the numerical value of the payoff corresponding to the other actions that he did not use). The strategy update is a B-G based reinforcement learning. Combined together one gets the B-G based CODIPAS-RL. The rest point L 2 can be seen as the equilibrium for a modified game with the perturbed payoff E s,
H i is the extra entropy term as discussed in [22] .
imitative B-G strategy mapping given bỹ
The learning pattern L 3 is given by
The imitative B-G learning weights the B-G strategy with the current strategy vector x i,t and the strategy mappingβ 
for every a i ∈ A i . The learning pattern L 4 is given by
Note that the exploitation function learningβ W i,t is time dependent in L 4 and is independent of parameter ǫ. If the learning yields an interior point as the equilibrium, then it is the exact equilibrium of the expected game, while the equilibrium in L 2 is an approximated one for the ǫ−perturbed game.
Weakened Fictitious-Play
where 1 ∈ R |Ai| is a vector with all its entries being 1;
Ai is the best response correspondence:
The learning pattern L 5 is given by
The weakened fictitious play L 5 has been discussed in [15, 18] . Different from the classical fictitious play, a player does not observe the action played by the other player at the previous step and the payoff function is unknown. Each player estimates its payoff by updatingû i,t using perceived payoffs. 
MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we introduce the new paradigm of hybrid learning, present the main results on learning in two-person general-sum games, and discuss their convergence properties for some special classes of games.
Stochastic approximation of the pure learning schemes
The pure learning schemes introduced in Section 14.3 share the same learning structure for average utility but differ in their strategy learning. Denote by Π (l)
i,t the strategy learning function for l ∈ L in the general form (14.2) . Following the multiple time-scale stochastic approximation framework developed in [5, 7, 14, 16] , one can write the pure learning schemes into the form
, where f
is a learning pattern in the form of stochastic approximation. q i,t is a time-scaling factor which is a function of the learning rates λ i,t and the probability of Pi in active mode at time t, denoted by P(i ∈ B 2 (t));q i,t is the time-scaling factor forû i,t . To use ODE approximation, we check first the conditions given in the Appendix. The term M
(l)
i,t+1 is a bounded martingale difference because the strategies are in the product of simplices which are convex and compact, and the conditional expectation of M i,t+1 given the sigma-algebra generated by the
The function f is a regular function, and hence Lipschitz over a compact set, which implies linear growth. Note that the case of constant learning rates can be analyzed under the same setting but the convergence result is weaker. Thus, the asymptotic pseudo-trajectories for the non-vanishing time-scale ratio, i.e., λ i,t /ν i,t → γ i for
where g i,t (resp.ḡ i,t ) are the asymptotic functions of q i,t , λ * t , p i (resp.q i,t , , ν * t , p i ). If the learning rates have the vanishing ratio, i.e., λt µt → 0, the asymptotic pseudotrajectories are
Stochastic approximation of the hybrid learning scheme
Players can choose different patterns at different time slots. Consider the hybrid and
, where l i,t ∈ L is the learning pattern chosen by Pi at time t.
Theorem 14.1 Assume that each player Pi, i ∈ N , adopts one of the CODIPAS-
RLs in L with probability 
(L) and the learning rates satisfy conditions (C1) and (C2). Then, the asymptotic pseudo-trajectories of the hybrid and switching learning can be written into the form
for the vanishing learning ratio λ i,t /ν i,t .
Proof : We first examine the strategy learning given by
By taking λ t as the reference learning rate, the drift (expected change in one step)
can be computed via
where we used the fact that E M (l) i,t+1 | F t = 0. The drift has the form
We check that the assumptions A1-A4 given in the Appendix are all met. The asymptotic pseudo-trajectory reduces to
For two time-scales CODIPAS-RL, we use the same lines as in [7, 31] .
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In Table 14 .2, we give the asymptotic pseudo-trajectory of the pure learning when the rate of payoff learning is faster than that of strategy learning. Let U j (x) := E s,B 2 U j (s, B 2 , x), j ∈ N . In Table 14 .2, the replicator dynamics are given bẏ
The smooth best response dynamics are given bẏ
The best response dynamics are given bẏ
and the payoff dynamics are
The imitative Boltzman-Gibbs dynamics are given bẏ
Connection with equilibria of the expected game
We study the convergence properties of the dynamics and their connection with the state-independent Nash equilibrium for three special classes of games.
Games with two actions
For two-player games with two actions, i.e,
2 }, one can transform the system of ODEs of the strategy-learning into a planar system under the forṁ 
Moreover, the system satisfies the Dulac's criterion.
Proof : We apply Theorem 14.2 with γ(·) ≡ 1 and find the divergence to be equal to −2, which is strictly negative. Hence, the result follows.
Note that for the replicator dynamics, the Dulac criterion reduces to
which vanishes for (α 1 , α 2 ) = (1/2, 1/2). It is possible to have limit cycles in replicator dynamics and hence the Dulac criterion does not apply. However, the stability of the replicator dynamics can be directly studied in the two-action case by identifying the game as one of four types: coordination, anti-coordination, prisoner's dilemma, hawk-and-dove [21, 27] .
The following corollary now follows from Corollary 14.1. 
Corollary 14.2 Consider a two-player two-action game. (CR1) Heterogeneous learning: If P1 is with Boltzmann-Gibbs CODIPAS-RL and P2's learning leads to replicator dynamics, then the convergence condition reduces
for all (α 1 , α 2 ).
Remark 14.2 (Symmetric games with three actions) If the expected game is a symmetric game with three actions per player, then, the symmetric game dynamics re-
duce to the two-dimensional dynamical system. This allows us to apply the Dulac criterion.
Lyapunov games
We say that a game Ξ is a Lyapunov game under a given hybrid dynamics if the resulting dynamics has an associated Lyapunov function
Note that a Lyapunov function V (x) is positive definite on R i |Ai| for every x = x * ∈ ∆, and its time-derivative is negative, dV dt < 0, for all x = x * , where x * is a stationary point of the dynamics [13] . The Lyapunov function can also defined to be negative definite as in [12] ; in this case, the time derivative will need to be positive. Proof : Lyapunov function V provides the stability of the set of rest points. Since the dynamics are positively correlated for adjusted replicator dynamics [21, 27] , the state-independent equilibria are rest points of the dynamics obtained from L 1 and
The stability of any convex combination of these dynamics follows.
Note that Theorem 14.3 says that starting from interior initial points, the hybrid dynamics lead to one of the equilibria, which we do not know which one in advance.
The set can have either a finite number or a continuum of equilibria. This result holds also for n−player stochastic games with random updates. Proof : Since the payoff matrix is bounded, we can study its strategically equivalent game [4] , [19] by subtracting a certain offset from every matrix entries so that U i (a) is negative for every strategy pair a, and hence E s,B 2 U i (e aj , x −i,t ) is negative. Without loss of generality, we can assume the game payoff matrix or its strategically equivalent game payoff matrix is negative entry-wise. Therefore, V R = Φ is negative. We take the time derivative of the Lyapunov function V R as follows:
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which leads to the following set of inequalities 
Lemma 14.3 Let
where H i : R |Ai| → R + are strictly concave perturbation functions which can take different forms depending on the pure learning scheme l. The ODEs corresponding to the learning schemes converge to a set of perturbed equilibria of the game Ξ.
Proof : Using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 14.2, we can assume Φ or its strategic equivalent form is positive without loss of generality, and hence V B is nonnegative. The Lyapunov function V B has its critical points given by
The first-order condition (14.10) yields the perturbed equilibria of the B-G type of learning schemes. By taking the time derivative of V B , we arrive at
.
Denote the perturbed payoff function by
The first-order condition for a maximum satisfies, for every a j ∈ A i ,
whereβ i (·) is a type of B-G strategy that corresponds to the learning type. Since the game is assumed to be a potential game, we have 
Due to the strict concavity of the perturbation functions H i , we conclude that dV B dt ≤ 0, with equality only at the equilibrium. Hence, the pure learning dynamics converge to the set of perturbed equilibria. 
SECURITY APPLICATION
In this section, we use the learning algorithm to study a two-person security game in a network between an intruder and an administrator. In Figure 14 .1, we show a local network connected to the Internet where an attacker attempts to launch an internal denial-of-service attack to bring down a network server capture important data from a workstation. Let P1 and P2 denote the administrator and the intruder,
respectively. An administrator P1 can use different levels of protection. The intruder P2 can launch an attack that can be of high or low intensity. Let the action sets for P1
and P2 be A 1 := {H, L} and A 2 := {S, W }, respectively. The network administrator is assumed to be always on alert while the intruder attacks with a probability p.
Hence, the set B 2 (t) can be of two types, i.e., (C1) {P1, P2} or (C2) {P1}. The former case (C1) corresponds to the scenario where the intruder and the administrator attack and defend, respectively, whereas the latter (C2) suggests that the administrator faces no threat. We represent the payoff under these two scenarios by M 1 and M 2 , respectively:
In (C1), a successful defense against attack yields a payoff of 2 for P1 while a failure results in a payoff of -2. A successful attack yields P2 a payoff of 1 while a failed attack yields a zero payoff. The employment of strong defense (H) or strong attack (S) costs an extra unit of effort as compared to the low defense (L) and the weak attack (W) for P1 and P2, respectively. In (C2), P1 stays secure without the threat from the intruder, and hence yields a payoff of 2. However, the high security level costs an extra unit of energy from the player.
The payoffs in M 1 and M 2 are subject to exogenous noise which varies in different environmental states s. The state-independent equilibrium of the game is found to be at
T and the optimal average payoffs arê The payoffs to the players with both players using L1. The payoffs to the players with both players using L2. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We have presented distributed hybrid strategic learning algorithms for a class of twoperson nonzero-sum stochastic games along with their general convergence and non- The payoffs to the heterogeneous players with P1 using L1
and P2 using L2. The mixed strategies of the heterogeneous players with P1 using L1
and P2 using L2. The payoffs to the players with both players using hybrid learning scheme with equal weights on L1 and L2. 
Appendix: Assumptions for Stochastic Approximation
Consider the difference equation x t+1 = x t + λ t (f (x t ) + M t+1 ) in R i |Ai| and assume that (A1) f is Lipschitz.
(A2) λ t ≥ 0, t≥0 λ t = +∞, t≥0 λ 2 t < ∞.
(A3) M t+1 is a martingale difference sequence with respect to the increasing family of sigma-fields F t = σ(x t ′ ,û t ′ , M t ′ , t ′ ≤ t) i.e., E (M t+1 | F t ) = 0.
(A4) M t is square integrable and there is a constant c > 0 such that
almost surely, for all t ≥ 0.
(A5) sup t x t < ∞ almost surely.
Then, the asymptotic pseudo-trajectory of the difference equation is given by the ordinary differential equation (ODE) [7, 14] ,ẋ t = f (x t ), with x 0 fixed. D R A F T October 2, 2011, 1:59am D R A F T
